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Abstract 
The paper engages the grey zone of violent resistance – the morally ambiguous 
situations facing liberation activists that have generally fallen outside the grasp of 
transitional justice scholarship. For this purpose, it draws on Albert Camus’s artistic 
sensibility, reconstructing how his artistic appeal to the limits of rebellion can tackle the 
difficulty of judging violent resistance. The paper demonstrates the relevance of Camus’s 
artistic sensibility on the case of the armed anti-apartheid struggle. It analyses two South 
African novels, Afrika’s The Innocents and Wicomb’s David’s Story, in an attempt to 
show how their literary insights can enrich the official vision of reconciliation as 
propounded by the TRC. 
 





The issue of violent resistance to oppression remains a challenging topic for 
transitional justice scholarship. What remains insufficiently explored, in particular, is 
the grey zone of violent resistance – the morally ambiguous choices and situations 
facing liberation activists that stem from their embeddedness within the very structures 
and relationships that resistance ultimately tries to subvert. Zoë Wicomb aptly 
summarized “the paradox” of an armed liberation struggle: “to take up arms […] is to 
enter the ugly world that has to be overthrown.”1 The evasion of this ambiguity within 
the transitional justice literature can be well demonstrated on the example of the South 
African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC). While the TRC has openly 
broached the issue of resistance justice, it has done so within the abstract framework of 
humanitarian law standards. It has thus failed to adequately examine the complexities of 
the anti-apartheid struggle as well as the systemic pattern of political violence in South 
Africa. The TRC’s omission of the ambiguities surrounding violent resistance is 
reflective of the predominant moral-juridical orientation within the scholarship, which 
works with neat categories of victims and perpetrators. Unaccounted for are the grey 
realities of complicity with – and resistance to – injustice that elude the grasp of clear-
cut categories of good and evil. And yet, the theme of violent resistance is important for 
bringing to the forefront the dilemmas and uncertainties of political action against the 
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background of systemic violence. As such, it also represents a valuable resource 
through which to rethink the potentials for reconciliation.2 
To reclaim judgement of the grey zone of resistance, I draw on Albert Camus’s 
existential, artistic insight into the experiential reality and ambiguity of rebellious 
politics. Camus’s artistic sensibility was shaped by an awareness of the irreversible loss 
of moral absolutes in modernity, and the concomitant recognition of the uncertainty of 
political action. In line with this outlook, Camus was particularly concerned with the 
problem of the justifiability and costs of violence employed in the service of freedom. 
Against self-certain, rational justifications of violence ruling the revolutionary struggles 
of his day, his artistic sensibility set forth a vision of rebellion attentive to the limits that 
accrue from acting in a plural world. His appeal to limits has often been interpreted as a 
moralistic refusal to assume the tragic exigencies and difficult choices inherent in 
resistant action.3 In contrast, I argue that it offers a situated insight into the grey zone of 
violent rebellion, where the refusal of complicity with an oppressive regime also needs 
to confront the burden of adding to the violence of the world. On this basis, the paper 
reconstructs how Camus’s artistic sensibility can tackle the difficulty of judging violent 
resistance in two important ways. First, it opens the space where violent resistance and 
responsibility for it can be approached in terms of its effects upon the intersubjective 
character of the world – rather than an abstract standard of either an idealist or 
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historicist kind. Second, it draws attention to the need to expose and confront the 
resilient conditions that render violence a necessary course of affairs. 
The paper demonstrates the relevance of Camus’s artistic sensibility on the concrete 
case of the armed anti-apartheid struggle in South Africa by analysing two South 
African novels: Tatamkhulu Afrika’s The Innocents and Zoë Wicomb’s David’s Story. 
Literary insights are put in dialogue with the official judgement of violent resistance as 
contained in the TRC Report, in an attempt to show how they can enrich the 
Commission’s vision of reconciliation.  
 
 
II. The problem of violent resistance and the TRC 
 
The issue of violent resistance has received surprisingly little attention within the 
transitional justice literature. The South African TRC in this respect is notable for 
openly broaching the issue of human rights violations committed by the anti-apartheid 
liberation movements.4 In doing so, however, the Commission adopted the principle of 
“legal equivalence,” whereby “[a] gross violation is a gross violation, whoever commits 
it and for whatever reason.”5 Drawing upon international humanitarian law – and the 
international standards of just war in particular – the TRC granted the justness of the 
(armed) resistance struggle against the evil of apartheid, but argued that the justness of 
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the end did not excuse committing human rights violations. While it insisted that state 
actors bore the greatest responsibility for past wrongs, the Commission also held the 
liberation movements “morally and politically accountable” for the abuses committed 
“in the course of their political activities and armed struggles.”6 The TRC’s engagement 
with the issue of violent resistance then displayed a lack of nuance in considering the 
circumstances, purpose or consequences of violent acts committed by the apartheid 
state, the resistance fighters, and within liberation movements themselves. This 
principle of legal equivalence has since been severely criticized. Several scholars noted 
that it had obscured the distinct challenges, losses and suffering of resistance fighters, 
artificially subsuming their experience under the categories of either victims or 
perpetrators.7 Critics also argued that the TRC failed to consider the context of the 
violent conflict and mistakenly used the same criteria to judge the pervasive systematic 
violence of apartheid and the “scattered human rights infringements” incurred in the 
fight against it.8 
The TRC’s omission of the particularity of violent resistance is reflective of its 
reliance on the predominant moral-juridical orientation within the scholarship, which 
assumes it is possible to arrange the complexities of agency in neat categories of victims 
and perpetrators. What remains unaccounted for is the so-called “grey zone” – those 
murky areas that elude the grasp of clear-cut categories of good and evil and instead are 
inhabited by varied dynamics of complicity and resistance.9 The underlying problem is 
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that the victim-perpetrator framework rests on the rational, legalistic conception of 
moral agency, understood as the ability to follow pre-given normative ideals, regardless 
of the agents’ embeddedness in a larger field of relationships and structures beyond 
their immediate control.10 As such, the moral-juridical paradigm bears potentially 
troubling political implications. Not only does it subscribe to a comforting view of past 
violence as deviation from the established moral norms, while failing to acknowledge 
the socio-political circumstances that made mass human rights violations possible. It 
also tends to conceive of the desired goal of transition as the re-establishment of a stable 
and just political order, while obfuscating the resilient forms of interaction that promote 
new practices of exclusion.11  
In the case of the TRC, indeed, an exploration of the dilemmas of political action in 
the context of structurally ingrained patters of political violence remained subordinate to 
the primary purpose of demonstrating “the moral fact of gross human rights 
violations.”12 In line with this focus, the Commission’s legalist judgement of violent 
resistance served the aim of acknowledging the human rights abuses committed by all 
sides of the struggle and grounding in stories of (universal) human suffering a new-
found commonality.13 To be sure, the TRC’s vision of reconciliation relied on opening 
the public space to a plurality of testimonies, to capture the systemic pattern of 
injustice.14 Yet, it did so through an “aggregation” of individual experiences of 
suffering and wrongdoing, which precluded a deeper insight into the specific dynamics 
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of political violence in South Africa.15 An exploration of the murky landscape of armed 
resistance, to the contrary, might help critically evaluate and challenge the entrenched 
ways of reasoning through which human rights violations became a normalized and 
justified course of affairs.16 
Against this background, this article sheds light on the “grey zone” of violent 
resistance, with a particular focus on the armed liberation struggle in South Africa. It 
aims to provide a situated insight into violent resistance as inhabiting a morally 
ambiguous space of painful choices, which cannot be adequately addressed with 
abstract moral standards. This moral ambiguity of resistance struggle results from its 
embeddedness within the very discourses, practices and processes that underpin the 
systemic oppression that resistance ultimately tries to subvert. Thus, focusing on the 
grey zone within the resistance camp arguably helps illuminate the subtle forms of 
complicity in the conditions that made past human rights violations possible, and the 
possibilities and limits of resisting them.17 In contrast to the TRC’s abstract legal focus, 
such a line of inquiry would explore how violent resistances were conditioned by the 
systemic violence and discourses of victimization; the extent to which they contributed 
to or broke away from the vicious cycles of violence; their costs and the forms of 
solidarity they inspired. To engage with these questions, the next section draws on 
Camus’s existential, artistic sensibility and its insights into the experiential reality and 
ambiguity of rebellious politics. 
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III. Camus and the grey zone of violent rebellion 
 
Camus’s vision of rebellion and its ambiguities is importantly underpinned by his 
existential artistic sensibility and its attentiveness to the situated and uncertain character 
of human action in a political world that no longer answers to the rule of transcendent 
foundations. In large part, his artistic disposition and its appeal to limits was framed as 
an effort to understand and challenge the advent of what he called “logical crime” – the 
tendency to rationalize violence in the service of a doctrine or idea, while removing it 
from the sphere of human judgement.18 Against this tendency, this section reconstructs 
how Camus’s artistic appeal to limits can illuminate and confront the ambiguity of 
violent rebellion. First, it explores how Camus’s artistic sensibility discloses a way of 
distinguishing between different violent rebellious actions with a view to the concrete 
standard of human plurality. Second, it delves into his artistic attempts to break the 
entrenched cycles of violence and uncover the possibilities for solidarity beyond the 
divides enforced by structural oppression.  
For Camus, rebellion is an expression of human freedom and dignity that ultimately 
stems from the awareness of the absurd. The absurd refers to the existential condition of 
human thought and action after the irreversible breakdown of traditional absolutes in 
modernity. As Camus writes, it denotes the experience of being “an alien, a stranger,” 
situated in a plural, unpredictable and ambiguous world lacking an ultimate purpose.19 
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Therefore, the biggest challenge confronting rebellious thought and action is to learn 
how to live and act, without “the memory of a lost home or the hope of a promised 
land.”20 Artistic sensibility here provides a promising alternative to the foundationalism 
of modern political thought – the desire to grasp the ultimate truth or telos of human 
existence.21 As Camus observes, the moderns have “killed” God, but have been less 
willing to accept the implications that this murder entails and never abandoned their 
desire for certainty “that only a God can provide.”22 Rationalist ethical and political 
systems were politically troubling because they sought to explain and order the whole of 
human reality in accordance with abstract categories of thought, while betraying its 
finite, plural and ambiguous character. Camus’s artistic attitude, in contrast, abandoned 
the philosophical desire for complete knowledge, to instead revel in describing and 
accounting for human embodied relationships with the world and others, without “any 
idea of finality.”23 What Camus referred to as the sensibility of an artist then is not 
limited only to his fictional works, but signifies a broader ethical and political 
orientation that he conveyed throughout his philosophical, political and literary 
writings.24 It denotes a mode of relating to the world characterized by a careful 
“attentiveness” to its untameable plurality and ambiguity.25 For Camus, it provided a 
medium for reinvigorating an experiential ground for moral and political action, 
attentive to the limits of the world and those of different others.26 
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On the political plane, Camus was particularly wary of modern teleological doctrines 
that – most prominently in the historicist spirit of the Hegelian-Marxist tradition – ruled 
the revolutionary struggles of his day. For him, these doctrines were based on a 
troubling logic of nihilism: they confronted the absurd by conceiving of rebellion as the 
progressive realization of an abstract, predetermined idea, culminating in absolute 
justice. This presumption of absolute freedom to construct new values, however, 
entailed a radical negation of human embodied, worldly being.27 As Camus aptly 
summarized the implications: any means could be justified as necessary to achieve the 
abstract ends of future justice.28 Rebellion modelled on artistic sensibility, in contrast, 
involves a simultaneous rejection and affirmation of reality.29 The artist’s rebellion “is a 
demand for unity and a rejection of the world. But it rejects the world on account of 
what it lacks and in the name of what it sometimes is.”30 Rebellion arises in response to 
particular situations of oppression, and not in order to realize a pre-conceived end of 
history. In rejecting injustice, it implicitly affirms the existence of a limit beyond which 
oppression will not be tolerated and also of “a standard of values” that should be upheld 
“at all costs.”31 Importantly, these values do not belong to the rebel alone, but articulate 
a demand for universal respect of common human dignity.32 Rebellion as an affirmation 
of the inherent dignity of human worldly existence implies the understanding that life is 
“the single necessary good” for all human beings.33 The human community invoked in 
rebellion then is not predicated upon a transcendent moral principle, such as universal 
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human nature. It arises from the realization that the absurd condition of human existence 
is not merely an individual burden to be suffered in solitude, but a common human 
fate.34 A judgement on the unacceptability of injustice thus always-already contains an 
appeal to the humanity of others, the same rebellious impulse that refuses to be crushed 
under the weight of an idea.  
The artistic attentiveness to human worldly existence here translates into a 
commitment to kindling the human condition of plurality. Resisting the tendency to 
subordinate the embodied presence of others to a tool in a war of abstractions, it always 
strives to see them as concretely situated, living individuals.35 Camus’s plural 
orientation mirrors Hannah Arendt’s understanding of human plurality as a fundamental 
condition of human existence, bearing the two-fold character of equality and distinction. 
For Arendt, human plurality refers to the fact that human beings are capable of 
manifesting their unique humanity through action and speech, yet can only do so in the 
company of their peers, distinct equals, who can endow particular words and deeds with 
an intersubjective meaning.36 As such, it is not a problem to be solved in the search for a 
(rational) consensus on the appropriate ends of political action. It is the very condition 
for bringing into existence a shared, public world, where human beings can come to 
terms with the worldly character of political affairs and decide what they “can and 
cannot do.”37 Camus’s artistic striving to see others as concretely situated individuals 
echoes Arendt’s insights in that it entails a commitment to bringing to light the common 
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humanity by embracing the differences that compose it. On this account, the solidarity 
affirmed in rebellion is not based on psychological identification, community of interest 
or a definite cause that presses others into agreement and instructs on the course of 
rebellious action. It is grounded in revealing the individual experiences of the absurd, 
suffering, injustice, or exile as (human) situations common to all.38 Akin to Arendt’s 
notion of a shared world, Camus’s artistic perspective thereby provides a platform, 
where different perspectives can be revealed and negotiated through their mutual 
interaction.39 It is this loyalty to human plurality that serves as an immanent criterion for 
judging rebellious practices, imposing a boundary that they must not transgress.40 
Among the left-wing intellectuals associated with Les Temps Modernes, Camus’s 
appeal to limits and his rejection of revolutionary violence earned him the title of a 
“counter revolutionary.”41 Camus’s position, Jean-Paul Sartre and Francis Jeanson 
insisted, amounted to an ethically troubling refusal to engage the murky realities of 
politics, and ended up affirming complicity with the existing structures of oppression.42 
Yet, Camus’s insistence upon limits amounts not to an absolute rejection of violence, 
but to a displacement of the opposition between moral purity and political efficiency as 
the only viable political alternatives.43 The principle of absolute non-violence recoils 
from the injustice, bloodshed and despair ruling the political world and can only find 
solace in an attitude of “abstention.”44 It in effect “sanctions” systemic violence.45 
Rational violence in the service of a doctrine, however, is just as “removed from reality” 
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in that it purports to grasp the underlying Truth of history, regardless of human plurality 
and the ensuing uncertainty of political action.46 Rather than an engagement with the 
grey realities of violent resistance, it implies a willing acceptance of tragic choices and 
painful stages to be redeemed at the end of history. In contrast to both these positions, 
the artistic loyalty to limits offers insight into the situated ambiguity of violent rebellion 
– maintaining the contradiction between a commitment to fighting injustice and the 
recognition that a resort to violent means breaches the value of the living community as 
the very source of rebellion.47 It opens the space where this contradiction can be 
creatively confronted through a consideration of a plurality of different perspectives on 
the world. In the following, I demonstrate the significance of this artistic orientation to 
judging violent rebellion by engaging Camus’s play The Just and his series of 
journalistic essays, Neither Victims, Nor Executioners. 
The Just is based on the historical example of the Russian terrorists of 1905, who, in 
the fight against an oppressive economic and political system, decide to assassinate the 
Grand Duke Sergei. The lived insight into the contradiction of rebellion is conveyed 
through the perspective of Ivan Kaliayev, also known as “the Poet.”48 Kaliayev’s artistic 
sensibility is reflected in the fact that his commitment to fighting injustice draws 
inspiration from his love of life and of this world, the values of beauty and happiness.49 
Stepan, a former political prisoner, finds the Poet’s attitude suspect, lacking “true” 
revolutionary credentials and discipline.50 Determined to throw the bomb at the Grand 
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Duke’s carriage, further, Kaliayev aborts his assassination attempt when he notices that 
Sergei’s niece and nephew are travelling along in the carriage.51 Stepan admonishes 
such “squeamishness,” arguing that the eventual triumph of the revolution and its vision 
of absolute justice justifies “doing anything and everything.”52 Kaliayev and his lover, 
Dora, in contrast, insist that their fight against injustice must contain a sense of 
measure: “Even destruction has a right and a wrong way, and there are limits.”53 
The just assassins’ affirmation of limits to violence leads to a reconsideration of the 
relationship between means and ends, as well as of the way of conceiving of the just 
cause. As Kaliayev exclaims: “I love the men who are alive today […] It is for them that 
I am fighting […] I shall not strike my brothers in the face for the sake of some 
unknown… distant city!” What Kaliayev opposes is Stepan’s blind faith in an ultimate 
future end, underlain by a nihilist disregard for – even hatred of – life in the present. 
Stepan admits his dogmatism arose from the experience of degradation and torture in 
the Czarist prison, which undermined his trust in fellow humans.54 Yet, he fails to 
consider that his reasoning ultimately mirrors the dehumanisation inherent in the 
system. For Kaliayev, indeed, Stepan’s abstract justification of violence obscures the 
ambiguity of judgement and responsibility, degrading the rebel to a mere instrument of 
murder and risking a lapse into “another kind of tyranny.”55 A wholehearted embrace of 
crime on this account is bound to betray the very cause which the revolution had sought 
to serve.  
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Kaliayev is likewise despairing of the unjust political conditions that “have forced us 
to be murderers,” yet is determined to fight these conditions by affirming, even in 
violence, the value of human solidarity.56 Kaliayev challenges Stepan’s vision of a just 
cause, arguing that he will not kill the Duke “by yourself… for no cause,” but “with 
us… on behalf of the Russian people!” If the solidarity for the suffering people serves 
as the only justification for political murder, violence cannot be rationalized in the 
service of absolute justice, defined from a position of solitary mastery, above others and 
the common world. Such justifications consign the authority to define and pursue justice 
to those in power, while seeing others as silent and enslaved objects that can be easily 
sacrificed for the realization of pre-given ends. Thus, they are bound to lose their 
ground and inspiring principle in the intersubjective character of the world and risk 
reproducing the dynamics of systemic oppression.57 In rebellion oriented by the value of 
human solidarity, to the contrary, violence can only be legitimately undertaken for the 
sake of the world, as an “extreme limit which combats another form of violence.”58 As 
Camus insists, rebellion loyal to its limits will only resort to violent means to, for 
instance, denounce instances of oppression or to establish institutions “which limit 
violence, not for those which codify it.”59 Rather than predefining the future vision of 
justice, it contains an appeal towards the establishment of conditions under which all 
individuals will be able to exercise their freedom and their right to state “what is just 
and what is unjust.”60 This orientation allows violence to remain “provisional,”61 
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enabling us to judge when violent means degenerate and turn against the very cause of 
human plurality that they were meant to uphold. 
Further, the play conveys the sense that violence, even against the oppressor, exacts a 
human cost, which cannot be assuaged by any future achievement of justice but carries 
with it “an ineradicable moment of accountability.”62 After Kaliayev eventually 
assassinates the Duke, he is determined to pay for his action by sacrificing his own life. 
In response to the Duchess’s offer of forgiveness, Kaliayev refuses to repent and reduce 
his assassination to a morally wrong act of murder. Behind the Duchess’s simplified 
moral condemnation of the act, we intuit, lies a generalized despair over this “empty and 
cruel” world that can only find solace in the embrace of another, eternal world.63 In 
contrast, Kaliayev assumes responsibility by affirming the ambiguity of his violent 
rebellion as a political act predicated not upon despair, but his love for fellow humans 
and the world.64 In his insistence on sacrificing his life, he both exposes the unjust 
conditions of political action that have “[forced him] into crime,” while also refusing to 
rationalize violence into a necessary course of affairs.65 Awaiting the news of his 
execution, Kaliayev’s comrades similarly reflect on their burden of responsibility. 
While they are resolved to continue their fight, they also remain attuned to how easily a 
decision to resort to violence might metamorphose into an indiscriminate embrace of 
terror.66 The just assassins are aware that the human cost of violence cannot be 
understood primarily with reference to a morally stained self that could repent and be 
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redeemed. Their example directs attention to the broken relationships and the fractured 
fabric of the world, the conditions that perpetuate the unjust circumstances of political 
action and increase the likelihood of further violence. 
Camus’s artistic engagement with the ambiguity of rebellious violence, then, does 
not resolve its tragic dilemma by offering a theoretical procedure for determining the 
legitimate use of violence.67 It reveals how easily the procedure of justifying ignoble 
means by worthy ends can slide into a generalized defence of violence, making it 
impossible to judge between acceptable and unacceptable acts. Camus’s dialogical 
focus, in contrast, points to a way of maintaining important distinctions between violent 
rebellious practices, keeping constantly in view the concrete possibilities for freedom 
they may open or foreclose, as well as the dangers of their reproducing the dynamics of 
systemic oppression.  
Camus remained constantly aware of the political conditions that render violence 
inevitable. After the French Liberation, he initially hoped that the sense of common 
purpose uniting the resistance fighters would pave the way for a social revolution. Soon, 
however, his enthusiasm gave way to a concern with the recalcitrant effects of 
systematic injustice that allowed for no easy transcendence. In his 1946 Combat series 
of essays, Neither Victims, Nor Executioners, Camus characterized these effects in 
relation to forms of political mentality that divided the world into the good and the evil 
and reduced agents to being either victims or executioners. He denounced the “infernal 
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cycle” of mutual denunciation, where each side justified its crimes in light of the 
excesses of the other.68 He called this “the conspiracy” of fear and silence, condemning 
the tendency to silence dissent and force people to choose between opposing sides, each 
of which claimed absolute truth.69  
Against this tendency, Camus called for dialogue grounded in a refusal to be either a 
victim or an executioner.70 This is not to be understood as a form of compromise that 
leaves unchallenged existing structures of injustice. Instead it leads to a renegotiation of 
the terms of the political community.71 For Camus, the victim-executioner binary was 
based on a utopian faith in “an earthly paradise,” that paradoxically foreclosed the 
possibility of a meaningful future.72 This is because, in seeking to make its absolute 
ideas part of political reality, it was bound to obscure the complexity of the world. Far 
from remedying injustice, it threatened to engulf the world into the “carnage” of 
“ideological warfare.”73 The same consideration guided Camus’s judgement in the case 
of the Algerian war. While his condemnation of the terrorist tactics on the part of the 
Algerian liberation fighters has been interpreted as a refusal to venture outside the frame 
of the colonial status quo, his perspective revealed how the ideological justifications of 
violence on both sides of the struggle in fact blurred the actual concerns of social justice 
and political liberty.74 In contrast, his artistic sensibility strove to foreground a “relative 
utopia,” aiming to reclaim the possibility of “human action” against the supposed 
“necessity” of history.75 
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This relative utopia was based on the human ability to “imagine” and judge any 
political decision or event in light of “their repercussion on living people.”76 It entailed 
a refusal to be trapped by the entrenched ideological polarities and a commitment to 
denouncing all instances of injustice, regardless of the “noble” ends pursued by their 
champions.77 This implied a willingness to self-critically consider one’s actions in 
relation to a plurality of perspectives, without, however, lending indiscriminate 
justification to the other side.78 When Camus appealed to the socialists to reject the 
Marxist dialectics of means and ends, for instance, he also was careful to point out this 
rejection was not tantamount to embracing bourgeois freedom, which has been 
historically used “to justify a very real oppression.”79 By contextualizing any action or 
justification, Camus’s artistic sensibility sought to create the conditions for the building 
of “a living society” of people “without a kingdom,” willing to interact beyond the 
ideological divides enforced by structural injustice.80 On this account, rebellion accepts 
the impossibility of final redemption and insists that a judgement on how to change the 








IV. A literary insight into the ambiguities of resistance violence in South Africa 
 
One may argue that Camus’s insights into the grey zone of violent rebellion are less 
than adequate to account for the case of the protracted conflict in South Africa, where 
violence became a systematic policy on all sides. As I have attempted to show in the 
previous section, however, the relevance of Camus’s artistic perspective lies in 
unearthing a space where violent resistance can be judged in terms of its effects upon 
the intersubjective character of the world – as opposed to a matter of abstract necessity. 
This section demonstrates the relevance of Camus’s artistic sensibility for the concrete 
case of the armed anti-apartheid struggle by analysing the two chosen South African 
novels. Both embody Camus’s commitment to human plurality, recognizing the 
complexities of violent resistance through a juxtaposition of a plurality of narrative 
voices. The first novel, The Innocents, exemplifies his insights into the limits of violent 
rebellion and the challenge of responsibility, while the second, David’s Story, elaborates 
on his efforts to confront the recalcitrant conditions that make violence appear 
inevitable. These literary insights are put in dialogue with the official narrative in the 






1. Afrika’s The Innocents: The limits of violence and the challenge of responsibility 
 
The Innocents recounts the undertakings of a small Muslim terrorist cell whose 
members must reconcile their commitment to black liberation with their ingrained 
religious views about the impermissibility of violence.82 To fight against apartheid, 
Yusuf and his friends, Himma, Mailie and Vincent, decide to join the armed wing of the 
resistance struggle, the People’s Army. They quickly learn that liberation is a dirty 
enterprise.83 Maponya, the local leader of the Movement, challenges Yusuf: “Tell me, 
Yusuf, have you ever killed a man, shot away his face, slipped a knife in his gut […] I 
see from your face you have not. Could you?”84 They understand that they are leaving 
behind the reassurance of clear-cut standards on the (in)justifiability of violence. While 
they frequently call to some higher authority, either God or the rules of Holy War, that 
“might sanction what seemingly could not be sanctioned,” their appeals remain 
unanswered.85 They have ventured beyond “the point of no return,” a territory of 
unknown outcomes and potentially tragic consequences.86 
To prove their worthiness as fighters, they commit acts of sabotage against symbols 
of white privilege and complicity with the oppressive system. The ambiguity of violent 
rebellion comes to the fore when they decide to attack a restaurant with “live” targets 
inside. Their reasoning is underpinned by their recognition of the pervasiveness of 
systemic violence, the deeply ingrained structures of racial and economic inequality, 
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with which “the rich whitey” is complicit by default.87 Nevertheless, Yusuf also 
reminds his comrades that, despite their privileged position in the system, these people’s 
deaths cannot be easily instrumentalised for the greater cause of justice.88 Just as his 
fight against injustice is based on an affirmation of solidarity across the divisions of 
race, he avoids abstract definitions of “the enemy” and is attentive to important 
distinctions among the perspectives and attitudes of the “oppressors.”89 Accordingly, 
they decide to merely frighten, rather than harm the diners, while nevertheless 
acknowledging the possibility of tragic accidents.90 Their position is in sharp contrast to 
Maponya’s, for whom the killing of “innocent” people does not represent just a tragic 
exigency of war, but assumes the mantle of moral rightness. He asks: “in this country, 
who is to say who is guilty and who is innocent? If a white woman, or child, or clerk in 
an office, hates me because my skin is black, is this not also my enemy?”91 This tension 
emerges again when, during the planning of another attack, Yusuf encounters internal 
opposition from Mailie. Thandi, Maponya’s niece and right arm, passes a gun to him: 
“It is a gift. From Maponya. For shooting dogs that disobey.”92 Yusuf adamantly refuses 
the methods of “the pitiless, blind giant of revolution,” and angrily responds: “Tell 
Maponya I do not need men who follow me because I have a gun.”93 While he aims to 
lead the squad in line with their common allegiance to the fight against oppression, he 
also wants to ensure that this commitment remains oriented by a sense of mutual 
friendship within the group. Rather than resorting to Thandi’s rule of expediency, he 
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maintains in their deliberations a dialogical openness to the opinions and concerns of his 
comrades.94  
Yusuf’s rebellion against Maponya’s vision of a “worthy” revolutionary echoes 
Camus’s exploration of the lived dimension and the limits of violent rebellion, posing a 
critical mirror to the TRC’s principle of legal equivalence. The TRC, to be sure, noted 
the important difference in the violations committed by, for instance, the African 
National Congress (ANC) and Pan Africanist Congress (PAC), the two main liberation 
movements. While the ANC mainly stayed within the framework of international 
humanitarian law, PAC’s policy was to “consciously [target] certain categories of 
civilians, and whites in general.”95 Yet, the TRC Report failed to account for how these 
different justificatory strategies were grounded in the ways in which the liberation 
movements related to the discourses of oppression ruling the apartheid state. Yusuf’s 
questioning of the abstract justification of violence and his commitment to human 
plurality, in this respect, highlight the importance of drawing a distinction between the 
essentially racialist framework of PAC and the multi-racial, democratic commitment of 
the ANC. Seeking to create a raceless society, the PAC paradoxically formulated the 
end of revolutionary action in line with a “racially assertive nationalism.” This 
principle, in turn, destined one of the existent race groups, the white, to extinction, 
thereby reinforcing the racial truth of apartheid.96 The ANC, in contrast, refused to 
conceive of the fight against oppression in terms of liberation of a pre-given identity 
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and rejected the “One Settler, One Bullet” ideology of PAC.97 It sought to break out of 
the framework of viewing the members of different race groups as merely abstract 
representatives of either “a despised race” or “a privileged and hated group.”98 It 
envisioned a multi-racial alliance, where varied groups would converge in the fight 
against apartheid, and resorted to armed struggle for the sake of establishing the 
conditions of freedom and justice for all groups within the South African society.99 Its 
vision of liberation enabled the ANC to employ a sense of “restraint” in identifying its 
targets.100 In response to the apartheid state’s blurring the distinction between military 
and civilian targets – in particular, its declaration of certain border regions as military 
zones where farmers were trained as para-military units – the ANC lay anti-tank mines 
in Transvaal rural areas, yet abandoned the campaign when it became clear that it led to 
numerous civilian deaths.101   
Due to its engagement with the grey areas of resistance struggle, The Innocents also 
exposes the challenge of responsibility in ways that the TRC’s focus on individual 
redemption and absolution could not.102 This is most evident in the last act, Yusuf’s 
tragic killing of Mailie. Yusuf finds that, following a failed attack, and their capture and 
interrogation by the police, Mailie had talked – a betrayal that resulted in other three 
fighters’ capture and Maponya’s death. In a confrontation, Mailie draws out a gun and 
Yusuf ends up stabbing him with a knife. While acknowledging that the act could not be 
wholly justified on the grounds of self-defence, he refuses to see it as a necessary means 
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to further the cause of revolution.103 Akin to Kaliayev’s reckoning with his violent act, 
Yusuf eschews repentance and a return to innocence, and is determined to continue the 
fight against oppression. Just as he rejects the perspective of divine grace, however, he 
refuses to seek justification in the dirty reality of resistance struggle, questioning the 
demand that everything must be sacrificed to the cause. 
Yusuf’s example also points to the political danger contained in the ANC’s way of 
assuming responsibility. The ANC tended to attribute human rights violations 
committed on the part of liberation activists to diversions from its policy: for instance, 
to excessive zeal, a desire for revenge or poor reconnaissance on the part of individual 
resistance fighters.104 The TRC, to the contrary, held the ANC collectively responsible 
for the abuses against civilians, those perceived to be “collaborators” and the so-called 
“enemy agents.” It also found that violations against the latter two categories amounted 
to a systematic pattern of violence.105 However, its analysis focused primarily on 
outlining how and why these actions constituted instances of moral wrongdoing, rather 
than critically evaluating the forms of reasoning that rationalized and allowed them to 
become systematic. This aspect comes to light in the testimony of a former MK 
(military wing of the ANC, called Umkhonto we Sizwe) commander and amnesty 
applicant, Robert McBride. In his statement, McBride expressed his regret over the 
suffering caused in “a quest for my own freedom and a quest to unshackle myself from 
the apartheid system.” He added he had voiced his concern over potential civilian 
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casualties, but was told by his ANC commander that “the injury to civilians was a 
secondary consideration at that stage.”106 Similarly, the troubling practice of 
rationalizing violence is evident in the testimony of Andrew Masondo, the ANC’s 
national political commissar. Talking about the abuses committed against so-called 
“enemy agents” in the Quatro detention camp, he said: “People who it was found that 
they were enemy agents, we executed them, and I wouldn’t make an apology. We were 
at war.”107 Both testimonies expose how quickly the practice of justifying ignoble 
means by worthy ends might derail, and lead to a situation not too different from the 
generalized state of emergency and impunity characterizing apartheid.108 
Simultaneously, they foreground the burden of responsibility as the need for constant 
vigilance against subtle forms of complicity in the conditions that normalized human 
rights violations.  
 
 
2. Wicomb’s David’s Story: Resisting the victim-executioner binary 
 
David’s Story is situated in 1991, the eve of South African liberation and its first 
democratic election. We meet David, a former resistance fighter, who tries to come to 
terms with human rights violations committed by the liberation movement. He wishes to 
tell his story, but is “simply unable/unwilling” to do so.109 A woman narrator – his 
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amanuensis, whom he employs to help write the tale – must construct the story while 
David distances himself from the text through constant digressions and denials. 
We read that David is a dutiful ANC cadre, who has “no illusions about war,” and 
often lectures his amanuensis that lies, errors and crimes are an inevitable part of the 
fight for freedom and justice.110 It was “military values,” he says, that brought us all this 
far, including those liberals, “the likes of you, who believe in keeping your hands clean 
at all cost.”111 Therefore, it comes as a troubling revelation that David himself spent 
some time in the Quatro camp. He supported the mutineers’ demands for greater 
democracy within the ANC, was put in solitary confinement and tortured, an experience 
that even to his wife he jokingly refers to as “initiation rites.”112 We also read his 
judgement about the execution of mutineers: “what else could have been done […] in 
the face of a steady infiltration of enemy agents?”113 The difficulty David encounters in 
confronting his past, however, is captured through Dulcie’s character, a “scream 
somehow echoing through my story” and “a disturbance at this very time of 
liberation.”114 
Dulcie, we learn from scattered references and hints, is a high-ranking member of the 
ANC, whose presence in the text is conveyed through an image of the tortured body, 
existing “before [David’s] very eyes.”115 While the ambiguous passages leave it unclear 
whether Dulcie was tortured by the security police or her own comrades,116 we are 
compelled to ask whether David himself is in some way implicated. His betrayal seems 
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to lie in remaining silent about the violence committed against her and so affirming his 
complicity with a system, where truth must remain “black and white” and where the 
rape and torture of women must remain an acceptable and hidden part of the struggle.117 
We learn that some of the mutineers “might have been trained by Dulcie,” and also that 
comrades have always “assumed” Dulcie and David, both coloureds, to be “somehow 
working together” – making both suspect to the Movement.118 To admit his love for 
Dulcie or any special relationship between them, further, would be “to betray the 
cause.”119  
In line with Camus’s concern with the persistent effects of systematic injustice, the 
novel thus exposes the resilient conditions that made human rights violations justifiable. 
David remains caught in a victim-executioner binary. He seems resigned that any 
attempt to defend and restore the memory of his beloved – and so openly consider the 
costs of the resistance struggle – would land him in direct opposition to the Movement. 
It was these conditions that the TRC’s abstract judgement did not adequately tackle. If 
the Commission’s principle of legal equivalence was to lead to a new unity across 
divisions, it missed out on the persistence of undemocratic social and political structures 
that silenced opposition and reduced the exercise of power to the pursuit of 
ideologically motivated interests.120 Yet, the narrative’s many voices – a constant back 
and forth between David, the voices of other characters and the writer – point to the 
possibility of displacing the stale ideological binaries characterizing the predominant 
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discourse, and reveal the ambiguities, disagreements and tensions obliterated from the 
official story.121 Towards the end, while insisting on the justness of the resistance 
struggle, David admits that the treatment of Dulcie was due to the power struggles 
within the Movement: “Yes, she’s grown too big for her boots and they’ve had enough 
of her […].”122 An encounter between different perspectives then shows the sterility of 
the choice between confronting the “abominable” realities of resistance with simplified 
liberal “pieties,” and unquestioningly justifying them as an inevitable part of the 
struggle.123 It is the clinging on to ideological divides that risks a lapse into “a corrupted 
version of the freedom” that the struggle rose up to defend, and into an “embrace [of] 
our [previous] oppressors.”124 
It is perhaps Dulcie’s example, her unwavering will to resist,125 that leads David, 
even if indirectly, to question the emerging intolerance and practices of exclusion within 
the ANC. In an attempt to retrieve the dignity of his origins, he becomes preoccupied 
with reclaiming the non-racial history of the Griquas, a subgroup of coloured people, 
traditionally known for their support of the apartheid policy of separate development. 
David finds that initially their Chief, Andrew Le Fleur, was a genuine rebel, tirelessly 
fighting colonial injustice. Due to various disappointments, betrayals and growing 
poverty in his community, he got “bought” by the settlers’ offer of land for his people 
and “converted” to the idea of separate homelands.126 For David, the problem was that, 
in his grand theory of a chosen race, Le Fleur “had no idea he was betraying his ideals, 
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falling into the hands of the policymakers.”127 It is unsurprising that David’s research is 
taken as a “breach of loyalty:” it challenges both the prejudice against blacks within the 
coloured community, as well as the growing ethnic ideology within the Movement.128 
Similarly, his inquiry into history reveals how the Chief’s call for justice for his people 
simultaneously imposes “a bundle of dreary” rules of behaviour upon the women of the 
community. Further, he keeps his wife locked in the private sphere, away from his 
“clandestine activities” that are deemed “too complicated” for the “second sex.”129 
Through the voice of David’s wife, Sally, however, we learn that, paradoxically, this 
history of oppression has been thoughtlessly repeated during the period of the liberation 
struggle and continues in the contemporary political climate. Using his influence in the 
Movement, David makes Sally quit her underground work and devote herself to 
community issues, a decision that leaves her “listless.”130 For all his obsession with 
Dulcie’s suffering, he fails to consider that Sally, too, had experienced “this unspoken 
part of a girl’s training.”131  
The novel heeds Camus’s artistic commitment to confronting the resilient conditions 
that made human rights violations possible through a resolute refusal of a choice 
between being either a victim or an executioner. Considering the grey zone of violent 
rebellion in a plural, contextual perspective, it enables us both to praise the inspiring 
promise of the fight against injustice, as well as explore how and why it degenerated 
into a corruption of freedom. Such inquiry then need not discredit the resistance 
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struggle, nor leave out a consideration of the oppressive system which the struggle had 
sought to overthrow. On the contrary, it constitutes an appeal to a continued fight 
against all denials of human dignity regardless of the perpetrating side. For this reason, 
it seems fitting to conclude this section with the same words that David had wanted to 





Using Camus’s artistic sensibility the article confronted the difficulty of judging the 
grey zone within violent resistance – a problematic that remains insufficiently explored 
in transitional justice scholarship. In particular, it revealed how Camus’s insight into the 
lived dimension of violent rebellion, its ambiguities and limits, can enrich the TRC’s 
abstract judgement of the human rights abuses committed by liberation fighters. Here an 
important caveat is necessary. It may be argued that a focus on the ambiguities of 
violent resistance unduly places the burden of responsibility at the doorstep of those 
fighting for freedom and justice, while absolving from blame the far greater violence of 
systemic oppression. As I have tried to show drawing on Camus, however, this need not 
be the case. To the contrary, focusing on the grey zone of resistance makes visible the 
difficulty of reclaiming political action against the background of structurally embedded 
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violence, and represents an important resource for rethinking the politics of 
reconciliation.  
Camus’s situated insight into the contradiction of violent rebellion exposes the limits 
of the moral discourse on reconciliation, predominant within the TRC. As argued, the 
TRC’s principle of legal equivalence was employed to re-establish the validity of moral 
norms and foreground a new commonality across past divisions. The Commission’s 
focus on the moral fact of human rights violations, however, missed out on the 
reproduction of oppressive structures that promote new modes of silencing and 
exclusion. Camus’s plural judgement of the ambiguities of violent rebellion and his 
attentiveness to how it can both reinforce or challenge the conditions of systemic 
violence, in contrast, displaces the view of reconciliation as the pursuit of (moral) unity 
of perspectives. Instead, it foregrounds a process of assuming responsibility for and 
continued vigilance against entrenched ways of reasoning that render violence against 
others justifiable.  
Relatedly, Camus’s perspective on the grey zone of rebellion challenges the 
aspiration towards closure at the heart of the TRC’s reconciliation efforts, where past 
suffering is to be ultimately redeemed by the promise of a just future. Camus’s 
contextual consideration of the costs of violent rebellion here is valuable as it directs 
attention to the examples of solidarity instituted by the resistance struggle, while also 
exploring the digressions from its inspiring principle. On this account, just as there is no 
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ultimate end to human rebellion, no vision of transition is likely to institute a final and 
complete reign of justice. Instead, the purpose of reconciliation is to reclaim the 
potentials for human action – bearing in mind its finite and imperfect character. 
Camus’s loyalty to the original promise of rebellion foregrounds reconciliation as a 
commitment to reinvigorating community beyond the stale binary of victims and 
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